Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on finite two-player non-zero-sum stochastic games. Following the notations used in earlier chapters, we let S be the state space, and A and B be the action sets of players 1 and 2 respectively. All three sets S, A and B are finite. Generic elements of S, A and B will be denoted by z, a and b. We let p(·|z, a, b) be the transition function of the game and r : S × A × B → R 2 be the (stage) payoff function of the game. We deal with games with complete information, perfect recall and perfect monitoring. Thus, at each stage n ≥ 0, the two players know the play h n = (z 1 , a 1 , b 1 , ..., z n ) up to that stage, and simultaneously choose actions a n and b n . The next state z n+1 is drawn according to p(·|z n , a n , b n ) and the play proceeds to the next stage.
The goal of this chapter, together with the next one, is to give an overview of the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Any finite two-player stochastic game has a uniform equilibrium payoff.
The proof partitions the state space S into three kinds of (disjoint) regions: solvable sets, controlled sets and remaining states. We devise an ε-equilibrium (σ, τ ) that coincides with a simple (periodic-like) profile (σ * , τ * ) until at least one player detects a deviation from the equilibrium play. From that stage on, a punishment threat is activated, i.e., each player switches to an ε-optimal strategy in a related zero-sum game.
Under (σ * , τ * ), the play eventually reaches a solvable set and remains there forever. In each controlled set, (σ * , τ * ) is of the type discussed in [4] , Section 5. Outside of the solvable sets and of the controlled sets, (σ * , τ * ) coincides with a stationary profile.
We shall only describe the structure of the proof, and provide selected details. For the complete proof, we refer to [8] , [9] .
We define solvable sets in Section 2. Section 3 explains the division of the proof into two parts, and describes the structure of the first part. The last two sections contain details.
Given C ⊂ S, we let θ C := inf {n : z n / ∈ C} denote the first exit stage from C. Given a measure µ , expectations with respect to µ are denoted by
Solvable Sets
We let Γ be any finite two-player stochastic game. We denote by Γ i , i = 1, 2 the zero-sum game obtained from Γ when the other player minimizes player i s payoff and we let v i : S → R be the uniform value of Γ i .
DEFINITION
Let (α, β) be a stationary profile, and R be a recurrent set for the Markov chain over S induced by (α, β). By the ergodic theorem for Markov chains, lim n→+∞ γ n (z, α, β) exists and is independent of z ∈ R. We simply write γ(R, α, β). For each C ⊆ S, we denote by R C (α, β) the (possibly empty) collection of sets R ⊆ C such that R is recurrent under (α, β).
, and (iii) µ is a probability distribution over R C (α, β) such that, for every z ∈ C, a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
Weak communicating sets are defined in [4] , Definition 4.2. The concept of solvable set is slightly more general than the concept of easy initial states, introduced by Vrieze and Thuijsman [6] . For simplicity, we abuse definitions and say that C ⊆ S is a solvable set as soon as (C, (α, β), µ) is a solvable set for some (α, β) and µ.
MAIN PROPERTIES
Solvable sets do exist (see [6] or [7] for two players, and [10] for a generalization to N -player games). Existence for two-player games is also a corollary to Proposition 8 below.
Lemma 3 Let (C, (α, β), µ) be a solvable set. Then
is a uniform equilibrium payoff, provided the initial state z belongs to C.
The players will play history-dependent perturbations of (α, β) such that the average payoff converges to R∈R C (α,β) µ(R)γ(R, α, β). The properties of a solvable set ensure that a unilateral deviation, followed by indefinite punishment, is not profitable.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and z ∈ C be given. Since C is a weak communicating set w.r.t. (α, β), one can construct a profile (σ * , τ * ) such that (i)
Adding to (σ * , τ * ) appropriate punishment threats yields a 2ε-equilibrium.
Remark 4 Lemma 3 holds as soon as current states and payoffs are observed by the players.
We now proceed to a first modification of the game. For each solvable set (C, (α, β), µ) and each z ∈ C, turn z into an absorbing state with payoff 1 Denote by Γ the game obtained this way. It can be checked that: (i) the solvable sets of Γ coincide with the absorbing states of Γ and (ii) each equilibrium payoff of Γ is an equilibrium payoff of Γ. The converse to (ii) does not hold.
Overview
Let Γ = (S, A, B, r, p) be a game, and ε > 0. By the previous section, we may assume that the solvable sets of Γ coincide with the absorbing states. W.l.o.g., we assume that r 1 (·) < 0 < r 2 (·). We denote by S * ⊆ S and S 0 = S\S * the subsets of absorbing and of non-absorbing states respectively.
Given such a profile, the play reaches S * with high probability.
A FEW DEFINITIONS
Definition 5 A controlled set is a pair (C, Q), where C ⊆ S 0 , and Q is an exit distribution from C that is controllable for any payoff vector γ ≥ v.
Controllable exit distributions are introduced in [4] , Definition 5.1. For simplicity, we sometimes refer to the set C itself as a controlled set.
Given a controlled set (C, Q), we let Γ C be the game obtained from Γ by turning the subset C into a dummy state {C}, where transitions are specified by Q, irrespective of actions being played, and payoffs are arbitrary. Thus, the state space of Γ C is S\C ∪ {C}.
More generally, let C be a family of disjoint controlled sets. We let Γ C be the game obtained from Γ by turning each set C ∈ C into a dummy state. To avoid confusion, the transition function of Γ C is denoted by p C , and we will add such subscripts whenever useful. For instance, S 0,C is the set of non-absorbing states of Γ C . It coincides with (
It can be shown that if Γ C has an ε-absorbing ε-equilibrium for each ε > 0, then so does Γ. (Note in particular that this excludes the possibility of "cycles" between the different controlled sets.)
A blocking pair (α, D) for player 2 is defined by exchanging the roles of the two players in Definition 6.
We also extend this definition to games obtained by reducing Γ.
Definition 7 Let C be a family of disjoint controlled sets. A pair (β, D),
where
We stress the fact that the value v 1 that is used is the value associated with the original game, and not the value v 1 C of the reduced game. 2 A state z ∈ S 0,C is either a state of S 0 or a controlled set C ∈ C. In the latter case, we set v i (C) = sup z ∈C v i (z ). There is no relation between reduced blocking pairs and blocking pairs of the reduced game.
The notion of reduced blocking pair is relative to the family C of controlled sets. No ambiguity should ever arise.
STRUCTURE OF THE PROOF
We here list the main steps of the proof, summarized by Propositions 8, 9 and 10 below. The corresponding proofs will be sketched in later sections. The proof is divided into two independent parts.
The first part (see Proposition 8) consists of constructing a (possibly empty) family of disjoint controlled sets C that, in a sense, exhausts the blocking opportunities for one player, say for player 1. We then turn the corresponding reduced game Γ C into a recursive game Γ R , by setting the payoff function to zero in each non-absorbing state, and by leaving Γ C unchanged in other respects. It will follow from the properties of C that any ε-absorbing ε-equilibrium profile of Γ R is an ε-absorbing ε-equilibrium profile of the reduced game Γ C , when supplemented with a punishment threat (see Proposition 9) .
The second part of the proof (see Proposition 10) consists of showing that recursive games such as Γ R do have ε-absorbing ε-equilibrium profiles.
Proposition 8 There is a collection C of disjoint controlled sets such that there is no reduced blocking pair for player 2.
Of course, there is nothing specific about player 2. The same result holds for player 1 as well.
Let Γ R be the game obtained from Γ C by setting to zero the payoff function in each non-absorbing state.
The game Γ R is recursive (see [1] , [5] ). Moreover, F1 all absorbing payoffs of player 2 (resp. of player 1) are positive (resp. negative). F2 for every α, there exists β, such that (α, β) is (0)-absorbing.
Proposition 9
If Γ R has a uniform equilibrium payoff, the game Γ C has an ε-absorbing ε-equilibrium profile, for every ε > 0.
Proposition 10 Every (finite, two-player) recursive game that satisfies F1
and F2 has a uniform equilibrium payoff.
Section 4 provides insights into the proof of Proposition 8. Proposition 9 is in most respects standard (see Section 5). Proposition 10 is discussed in the next chapter.
The Reduction
We here prove Proposition 8. If there is no blocking pair, the statement holds vacuously. We thus deal with games that have at least one blocking pair. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we prove that such games have a controlled set (see Proposition 13). This is not sufficient by itself, since the corresponding reduced game may contain additional reduced blocking pairs. In Section 4.3, we explain how to proceed iteratively.
THE BASIC PRINCIPLE
We start with a basic yet crucial observation. Denote by α λ an optimal strategy of player 1 in the λ-discounted version of the zero-sum game Γ 1 . Hence,
(1) Set α := lim λ→0 α λ , where the limit is taken up to a subsequence. Letting λ go to zero in (1), one gets
Define also β as a limit, as λ converges to zero, of optimal stationary strategies of player 2 in the discounted zero-sum game Γ 2 .
Lemma 11 Let (α, D) be a blocking pair for player 2. There exists D ⊆ D, such that: (i) v 2 is constant on D; (ii) D is a weak communicating set w.r.t. (α, β); (iii) (α, D) is a blocking pair for player 2.
Proof. Lemma 11 is the simplest statement of a basic principle that underlies the reduction algorithm. Apply Lemma 11 to any blocking pair (α, D) for player 2. D is a controlled set or both (α, D) and (β, D) are blocking pairs.
In the next section, we prove that, in the latter case, there is a controllable exit distribution from D, based on joint perturbations of the two players.
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONTROLLED AND SOLVABLE SETS
We let D ⊆ S 0 be a weak communicating set w.r.t. (α, β), such that both (α, D) and (β, D) are blocking pairs. We shall prove that either D is solvable or there is some controllable exit distribution from D. Since, by assumption, S 0 does not contain any solvable set, this yields Proposition 13 below.
Proposition 13 If Γ has a blocking pair, then Γ has a controlled set.
The argument in Section 4.1 used only the subharmonic properties of v 1 (resp. of v 2 ) with respect to the kernel p(·|z, α z , β z ) (resp. p(·|z, α z , β z )). We here use arguments of a different nature.
For expository purposes, we assume that for each state z ∈ D, and each action pair (a, b), one has p(D|z, a, b) = 0 as soon as p(D|z, a, b) < 1.
Reminder about ε-Optimal Strategies
We first point out a consequence of the proof of the existence of the value in finite zero-sum stochastic games (see [3] ).
Let (α λ ) λ≤λ 0 and (β µ ) µ≤µ 0 be parametric families of stationary strategies, where λ 0 > 0 and µ 0 > 0. Assume that, for every z ∈ S, λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ), µ ∈ (0, µ 0 ), one has
Then, close inspection of the proof in [2] shows that for every ε > 0, the following holds under (2) . There exists a strategy σ which always plays according to some α λ , in the sense that, for each finite history h n , there is
, such that: for each strategy τ which always plays like some β µ , and each initial state z,
Moreover, the same result holds in every subgame, in the following sense. Given a finite history h p , let (σ h p , τ h p ) be the profile induced by (σ, τ ) in the subgame initiated at h p , and let z p be the initial state of that subgame. Then, for every n large enough, one has
Observe also that if the inequality (2) holds for each λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ), it holds a fortiori for each λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ), provided λ 0 ≤ λ 0 . Therefore, one may assume that λ(h n ) < ε, for every finite history h n .
Finally, it can be checked that if some states z ∈ S 0 are replaced by absorbing states with payoff v(z) + ε, then the conclusion (3) will still hold in the modified game. 3 
Application
In Mertens and Neyman's original proof, α λ is taken to be an optimal strategy of player 1 in the λ-discounted zero-sum game. No restriction on the strategies of player 2 is needed.
By contrast, we here define α λ as follows. By definition of α, there exists, for each λ > 0, an optimal stationary strategy α λ in the λ-discounted game such that lim λ→0 α λ = α. For z ∈ D, set A z = {a ∈ A, p(D|z, a, β z ) = 1}, and define α λ z to be the conditional distribution of α λ z , conditioned on A z . Define β µ accordingly for player 2, by conditioning β µ on the set
It is straightforward to check that:
− lim λ→0 α λ = α, and lim µ→0 β µ = β. − For every z, the inequality (2), together with its counterpart for player 2, holds, provided λ and µ are small enough.
It will be convenient to apply the result of Section 4.2.1 to a slightly modified game. Let ε > 0 be given. Turn each state z / ∈ D into an absorbing state with payoff (v 1 (z) + ε, v 2 (z) + ε). Using the final remark of Section 4.2.1, there exists a profile (σ ε , τ ε ) of strategies, such that:
For n large enough, γ n (z, σ ε , τ ε ) ≥ v(z) − ε, and the same holds in any subgame. 4 Let p ε := P z,σ ε ,τ ε (θ D < +∞) be the probability that the play ever leaves D. We discuss two non-mutually exclusive cases.
Case 1 There is a sequence (ε n ) converging to zero, with p ε n = 1 for every n.
We here argue that there is a controllable exit distribution from D. Indeed, let ε belong to the sequence (ε n ), and denote by
On the other hand, p(D|z n , σ ε (h n ), β zn ) = 1 = p(D|z n , α zn , τ ε (h n )), for every history h n . Thus, Q ε belongs to the set Q 2 (α, β) (see [4] ), that is, Q ε is a convex combination of the distributions p (·|z, a, b) where (z, a, b 
is compact, and using (4), there is a distribution Q ∈ Q 2 (α, β)
Since Q involves no unilateral exits, and since both pairs (α, D) and (β, D) are blocking, it is not difficult to conclude that the exit Q is controllable (with respect to any γ ≥ v).
all solvable sets in the game correspond to absorbing states. This need not be the case for the reduced game. The reduced game being only a fiction, such additional solvable sets would be very difficult to interpret in the original game.
It turns out that such troubles can safely be avoided by somehow reversing the argument and by proceeding in only two steps.
Step 1 Step 2 For given C ⊆ S 0,D , we define the properties C1 and C2 as:
C1 v 2 is constant on C; C2 for some α, C is communicating for (α, β) and (α, C) is a reduced blocking pair for player 2.
Let C 1 be a maximal subset of S 0,D (if any) that satisfies both C1 and C2. Iteratively, we let C l be a maximal subset of S 0,D \(C 1 ∪ ...C l−1 ) that satisfies both C1 and C2, if any. Let E be the collection of subsets of S 0 D obtained in this way. 5 5 It is not uniquely defined.
Let C be an arbitrary element of E. By Step 1, the pair (C, β) is not a reduced blocking pair for player 1. This can be shown to imply that (C, β) is not a blocking pair for player 1. Therefore, for some (z, a) ∈ C × A, the pair (C, p(·|z, a, β z ) ) is a controlled set.
As above, we may view elements of E as subsets of S 0 . We finally let C = E ∪ D 1 , where D 1 is the collection of sets D ∈ D that are disjoint from each C ∈ E.
The next lemma is a slightly involved variant of Lemma 14. It concludes the sketch of the proof of Proposition 8.
Lemma 15 Consider the reduced game Γ C . There is no reduced blocking pair for player 2.
Reduced Games and Recursive Games
It remains to prove Proposition 9. It is based on the next lemma, which itself relies on the idea that the reduction eliminated all blocking pairs for player 2.
Lemma 16 Let C be a collection of disjoint controlled sets such that there is no reduced blocking pair for player 2. In the reduced game Γ C , the following holds. For each stationary strategy α, there exists β such that the profile (α, β) is (0)-absorbing and γ 2 (z, α, β) ≥ v 2 (z).
We stress once more the fact that v 2 is the value associated to the original game Γ 2 .
Proof. Choose β such that, for each z, the support of β z consists exactly of those b ∈ B such that E v 2 |z, α z , b ≥ v 2 (z), and notice that E C v 2 |z, a, b ≥ E v 2 |z, a, b , for every (z, a, b). It can be shown that β satisfies both conclusions. We conclude by sketching the proof of Proposition 9. Let (σ, τ ) be an ε-absorbing ε-equilibrium of Γ R . For N ∈ N large enough, the profile which plays (σ, τ ) up to stage N , and punishment strategies afterwards, is an ε -absorbing ε -equilibrium, where ε > ε goes to zero with ε. 6 
